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Suche nach „[S.] [Städter]“ hat 4 Publikationen gefunden
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    Angewandte Wirtschaftswissenschaften

    Zeitschriftenartikel

    Marcus Dittrich, S. Städter

    Regulating executive pay: Incentive contracts and non-binding bonus caps

    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. [To be published]

    2020

    Angewandte Wirtschaftswissenschaften

    Zeitschriftenartikel

    Marcus Dittrich, S. Städter

    Monitoring 'lemons': Why lower productivity workers are sometimes monitored more closely

    Applied Economics Letters, no. Published: 18 June 2020

    2020

    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2020.1776826

    Abstract anzeigen

    We analyse workplace monitoring in a principal–agent model with two types of workers who differ in their productivity. The firm decides on the effort level, the wage and the monitoring intensity for both workers. We find that the elasticities of the workers’ effort-cost function and the firm’s monitoring-cost function affect the firm’s monitoring intensity. Our results imply that the firm might monitor the low-productive worker more closely than the high-productive worker.

    Angewandte Wirtschaftswissenschaften

    Zeitschriftenartikel

    Marcus Dittrich, S. Städter

    Moral hazard and bargaining over incentive contracts

    Research in Economics, vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 75-85

    2015

    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2014.10.002

    Abstract anzeigen

    This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker׳s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution depends on the agents׳ bargaining power. The social planner can mitigate inefficiencies arising in both bargaining solutions from the moral hazard problem and even achieve the first-best outcome by allocating the agents׳ bargaining power. If raising the worker׳s bargaining power is necessary to achieve the first-best solution, this increase must be higher in the Nash solution than in the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.

    Angewandte Wirtschaftswissenschaften

    Zeitschriftenartikel

    Marcus Dittrich, S. Städter

    Monitoring 'lemons': Why lower productivity workers are sometimes monitored more closely

    [Forthcoming publication]

    Applied Economics Letters