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Suche nach „[V.] [Grimm]“ hat 2 Publikationen gefunden
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    Europan Campus Rottal-Inn

    Zeitschriftenartikel

    H. Rau, G. Stephan, V. Grimm, Robert Feicht

    On the impact of quotas and decision rules in collective bargaining.

    European Economic Review, vol. 100, no. November, pp. 175-192

    2017

    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.08.004

    Abstract anzeigen

    We conduct a novel type of multi-person one-shot game that reflects important aspects of collective bargaining. In all treatments a proposer has to divide a pie among herself and two groups of three recipients each. She cannot discriminate within, but across groups. A committee with representatives from one or both groups takes acceptance decisions. In a 2 × 2 design we vary (i) representation in the decision committee (one vs. both groups) and (ii) the decision rule (unanimity vs. majority voting). We find that (i) representation of a group in the committee is crucial for receiving a significant share, (ii) proposals are balanced only if both groups have veto power, (iii) negotiations often fail if the decision environment gives insufficient guidance on what an appropriate proposal is, and (iv) non-binding communication substantially reduces rejection rates and proposer shares.

    Europan Campus Rottal-Inn

    Zeitschriftenartikel

    M. Seebauer, V. Grimm, Robert Feicht

    An experimental study of corporate social responsibility through charitable giving in Bertrand markets

    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 124, no. April, pp. 88-101

    2016

    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.005

    Abstract anzeigen

    We experimentally investigate a Bertrand market with homogenous goods in which sellers can announce the donation of a share of their profits to an existing non-profit organization. In a 2 × 2 design, we vary the credibility of announcements and the efficiency of the contributions to the public fund. We find that sellers’ donations are strictly positive independently of the credibility of the announcements, and their donations are higher if announcements are credible and efficiency is high. However, market outcomes in terms of prices and profits do not differ significantly in any treatment that allows for contributions to a public fund. Analysis of buyer decisions reveals that prices are the main driver of purchase decisions while higher donations only affect purchase decisions when they are credible and price differences are negligible. Our results indicate that under intense competition the possibility of attracting customers through corporate social responsibility activities is limited, although the constant positive level of contributions suggests that norms lead to a certain minimum level of corporate social responsibility.