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Suche nach „[S.] [Städter]“ hat 4 Publikationen gefunden
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    F: Angewandte Wirtschaftswissenschaften

    Beitrag (Sammelband oder Tagungsband)

    Marcus Dittrich, S. Städter

    Regulierung von Managergehältern - ein spieltheoretischer Ansatz

    Kapital in Recht und Wirtschaft, Göttingen, vol. 85

    2021

    ISBN: 978-3-7369-7360-2

    F: Angewandte Wirtschaftswissenschaften

    Zeitschriftenartikel

    Marcus Dittrich, S. Städter

    Regulating executive pay: Incentive contracts and non-binding bonus caps

    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), no. 09 October 2020, pp. 1-16

    2020

    DOI: 10.1628/jite-2020-0045

    Abstract anzeigen

    This paper analyzes the effects of a regulatory cap on executive pay. We use a principal-agent model with moral hazard in which a firm and a manager bargain over an incentive contract, and we discuss the consequences of a nonbinding cap on bonus payments. We find that the bonus cap negatively affects the manager's effort choice and social welfare, even if the cap is introduced at a nonbinding level.

    F: Angewandte Wirtschaftswissenschaften

    Zeitschriftenartikel

    Marcus Dittrich, S. Städter

    Monitoring 'lemons': Why lower productivity workers are sometimes monitored more closely

    Applied Economics Letters, no. Published online: 18 June 2020

    2020

    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2020.1776826

    Abstract anzeigen

    We analyse workplace monitoring in a principal–agent model with two types of workers who differ in their productivity. The firm decides on the effort level, the wage and the monitoring intensity for both workers. We find that the elasticities of the workers’ effort-cost function and the firm’s monitoring-cost function affect the firm’s monitoring intensity. Our results imply that the firm might monitor the low-productive worker more closely than the high-productive worker.

    F: Angewandte Wirtschaftswissenschaften

    Zeitschriftenartikel

    Marcus Dittrich, S. Städter

    Moral hazard and bargaining over incentive contracts

    Research in Economics, vol. 69, no. 1, pp. 75-85

    2015

    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2014.10.002

    Abstract anzeigen

    This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker׳s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution depends on the agents׳ bargaining power. The social planner can mitigate inefficiencies arising in both bargaining solutions from the moral hazard problem and even achieve the first-best outcome by allocating the agents׳ bargaining power. If raising the worker׳s bargaining power is necessary to achieve the first-best solution, this increase must be higher in the Nash solution than in the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution.